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Government agencies make countless decisions each year whether to
grant or revoke benefits, adjudicating interests as varied as business li-
censes, parole release dates, and welfare payments. The Supreme Court's
recognition in 19701 of a duty to review the process by which agencies
make these decisions has contributed to a due process "explosion." 2 Un-
willing to impose the full burden of this review either on themselves or on
government agencies,3 the courts now self-consciously apply a two-part
test: Before they ask what process is due to assure that decisions are mini-
mally rational,4 courts first ask if a decision requires due process review at
all.
In answering these questions, the courts have placed great importance
on the extent to which the discretion of a decisionmaker is limited by rules
1. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (agency must follow due process before stopping
welfare payments).
2. See J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9 & nn.22-23 (1985) ("fed-
eral court complaints of procedural due process deprivation in the 1970's showed a 350 percent in-
crease over the 1960's"). Among the benefits that have been the subject of due process challenges are:
government contracts, welfare benefits, zoning rights, business and professional licenses, driver's li-
censes, public employment, student admissions and attendance at all levels of schooling, foster
parenthood, lawyers' permission to appear pro hac vice, and a full range of prison interests including
parole, pardon, discpline, transfer, and work-release. See also Rendleman, The New Due Process:
Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 532-34 (1975) (citing early post-Goldberg cases).
3. Because procedural due process applies only to the adjudicative process, the burden of review
does not extend to decisions which courts characterize as legislative and not adjudicative. See Non-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Col., 239 U.S. 441 (1915). Though a conven-
tional distinction of administrative law, the line between adjudication and rulemaking is not always
clear. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2 (1979); see also Elrod, The Effect of
Procedural Due Process on State and Local Governmental Decisionmaking: Beyond Roth and
Eastlake, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 706 & n.204, 710 & nn.237-38 (1982) (providing many examples
in which distinction is wholly formalistic). In general, the theory is that rulemaking creates policies of
general scope prospectively while adjudication applies policies to specific facts retrospectively. See
United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973). In this sense, virtually all
government officials dealing directly with the public "adjudicate," so the potential reach of due pro-
cess is enormous.
4. In its broadest formulations of the purposes of procedural due process, the Supreme Court
usually refers to the assurance of rational decision-making. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974) (procedural due process entitles prisoner "to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right
is not arbitrarily abrogated").
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or standards. In general, if officials exercise broad discretion 5 to provide
or revoke an interest, courts refuse to examine the procedures they follow.
Further, if rules only partially confine discretion, some court decisions
have cited the remaining discretion as a justification for reduced proce-
dural protection.
This essay criticizes this approach as inverted. Although broad adjudi-
cative discretion often has merit, it also poses a threat of unequal, capri-
cious, even vindictive decisions. Instead of viewing unlimited discretion as
a reason to limit judicial review, courts should treat the breadth of discre-
tion as a "process" variable which they can influence and for which they
can order compensating procedural checks.
I. THE ENTITLEMENT ANALYSIS
Before 1970, courts did not generally apply procedural due process
analysis to decisions affecting government benefits-interests that the indi-
vidual would not enjoy except for a government grant. The courts rea-
soned that those decisions cannot deprive an individual of "life, liberty or
property."' In the early 1970's, however, the Supreme Court reversed this
stance and indicated in some decisions a willingness to provide due process
protection to all important individual interests affected by government
decisions.'
5. In a seminal article, Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued that the concept of adjudicative
discretion has several different meanings. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14,
32-34 (1967). An administrator applying vague standards has one kind of discretion in the sense that
he must exercise judgment. An administrator whose decision is unreviewable has discretion in a sec-
ond sense. And an administrator whose decision "is simply not bound by standards set by" authority
exercises a third kind of discretion. Id. at 33.
Dworkin's first and third forms of discretion are related in that they both depend on the extent to
which an administrator's decision is controlled by standards set by superior authorities. Whenever the
rules and standards that guide adjudicative decision-makers are highly general, the decision-makers
applying them either make policy, however unconsciously, or make the decision arbitrarily. This au-
thority to make policy in the adjudicative setting is the essence of adjudicative discretion. See L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 586 (1965) (defining administrative discre-
tion as "the power of the administrator to make a choice from among two or more legally valid
solutions"). The entitlement analysis for due process utilizes discretion in this sense.
6. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1439, 1439-45 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege
Distinction]; Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Adminis-
trative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 447-49 (1977) (noting that eradication of right-privilge
distinction for purposes of government action that burdened specific constitutional rights did not eradi-
cate distinction for purposes of procedural due process) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Cracks in
the "New Property"].
Additionally, self-imposed "hands off" doctrines largely precluded judicial review of power exer-
cised in schools, see Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional
Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 559-73 (1971) (discussing balancing of hands-off doctrine with
more modern, activist approach), and prisons, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
7. The lead decision, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), relied in part on a statutory entitle-
ment to welfare benefits as the basis for the property interest. Id. at 262. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
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In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has contracted the due
process frontier by enforcing a highly formalistic entitlement approach.,
Only if a rule provides substantive criteria that limit an administrator's
discretion to withhold or revoke some interest does an individual have an
entitlement protected by due process.' While any form of government rule
may create an entitlement-even a policy statement promulgated by the
very government officials who apply it 1°-it must be mandatory. Thus,
rules that provide standards to guide discretion will generally not invoke
due process protection if they provide only that administrators "may"
make a decision on the basis of these standards."
535, 539 (1971), however, the Court held that the suspension of a driver's license required due pro-
cess protection solely because of its importance. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82(1972), the Court held parole release protected by due process on the grounds that it included many of
the "core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and
often on others."
8. The Court first enunciated the entitlement analysis in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972), which held that property rights invoking due process are created and defined by positive
law. For other kinds of property interests to which the Supreme Court has applied the entitlement
analysis, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1491-93 (1985) (civil service
employment); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-33 (1982) (right of action to
obtain administrative remedy for employment discrimination); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64(1979) (horse trainer's license); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441-43 (1979) (lawyer's permission to
appear pro hac vice in state court); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)(continued receipt of electrcity); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975) (public school attend-
ance). The Supreme Court has held that due process protection for liberty interests also depends on
their recognition in positive law and has applied this principle primarily in prison cases. See, e.g.,
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979) (parole release); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976) (transfer to administrative segregation); Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974) (prison good-time credits); see also Paul v. Davis,. 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976)
(public identification on list of active shoplifters).
9. While purely procedural rules will not create due process rights, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238, 248-51 (1983), rules that substantively limit a decisionmaker's discretion will, see Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983). The substantive criteria need not be detailed, however. Even a
civil service regulation that prevents a dismissal except "for cause," with no elaboration on what
constitutes "cause," creates a due process entitlement. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52(1974) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). This leniency suggests that the Court has arrived at the entitlement
test by attempting to define "life, liberty or property," not by an explicit conclusion that unfettered
discretion makes due process unnecessary.
10. For a good review of the recent cases on prison policy statements, see Lucas v. Hodges, 730
F.2d 1493, 1502-06 & nn.17-21 (D.C. Cir.) (prison policy statements create liberty interest if they
"have been read . . . as limiting the discretion of the ultimate decision-makers," but not if "they are
interpreted merely as guidelines"), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
11. The requirement for mandatory language has been expressed by the Supreme Court most
explicitly in cases affecting prisoners. See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 463-466 (1981) ("The Connecticut commutation statute, having no definitions, no criteria, and
no mandated 'shalls,' creates no analagous duty or constitutional entitlement."); Greenholtz, 442 U.S.
at 11-12 (focusing on unique mandatory "structure and language" of Nebraska parole statute);
Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653, 657 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding "shall/may language" at
least "important factor" in determination of liberty interest and citing cases considering this langugage
"talismanic"). Compare Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1982) (entitlement in
federal parole system) with Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979) (no entitlement to
parole release under New York law despite almost identical statutory standards and similar guideline
system as in federal system because New York parole statute lacks mandatory language). Cases deal-
ing with property interests, however, also require mandatory language. See, e.g., Davis v. Ball Memo-
rial Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30, 41 (7th Cir. 1980) (entitlement to medical care exists only if right to
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The Supreme Court has recognized a few exceptions to the entitlement
analysis. A mutual understanding (in the nature of an implied contract)
may create a property interest,1" injury to reputation may violate a liberty
interest,"' and some liberty interests are so fundamental that they invoke
due process protection even without statutory or regulatory recognition.
1 4
its receipt depends entirely on controvertible facts); Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.
1980) (entitlement to gaming license depends largely on existence of "mandatory language" in
statute).
Some members of the Supreme Court have suggested broader versions of an entitlement analysis
that does not require mandatory language. In Leis v. Flynt, Justice Stevens, speaking for four justices
in dissent, rejected the majority's holding that Ohio law did not create a due process entitlement to a
lawyer's appearance in its courts pro hac vice. 439 U.S. at 454 (1979). Justice Stevens argued,
"[w]hile it is unquestionably true that an Ohio trial judge has broad discretion," Ohio law permitted
higher court reversal and thus the trial judge "had no power to act arbitrarily." Id. at 455. He argued
that this restriction created a property right protected by due process. But neither a Supreme Court
majority nor the vast majority of lower courts have proved willing to recognize entitlements merely
because of some limitation on discretion; they have required that benefits automatically follow the
satisfaction of specified criteria.
12. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (property interest recognized in continued em-
ployment). But see Jago v. Van Curren, 454 U.S. 14, 18-21 (1981) (per curiam) (mutual understand-
ings can create property but not liberty interest). Thus, courts sometimes hold that those receiving
benefits have entitlements to their continuation even in the absence of mandatory rules. See, e.g.,
Stoller v. College of Medicine, 562 F. Supp. 403, 412 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (property right to continued
medical education), affd mem., 727 F.2d 1101 (3d Cir. 1984); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South,
Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1974) (custom of renewal means existing public tenants have due process
rights in lease renewal); Martin v. Helstad, 578 F. Supp. 1473, 1480 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (although no
statutory entitlement to law school admission, acceptance creates entitlement).
13. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), the Court held: "Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Although Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976),
limited this liberty right to injuries to reputation that accompany some change in legal status, a denial
of a government benefit that is not itself a protected property interest infringes on protected liberty if
the government publicly disseminates a stigmatizing reason. See, e.g., Doe v. United States Dept. of
Justice, 753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discharge from public employment for publicly disclosed,
defamatory reasons infringes on protected liberty interest); Old Dominion Dairy Products v. Secretary
of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (although no protected property interest in government
contracts, "'stigmatizing' governmental defamation having an immediate and tangible effect" on con-
tractor's business infringes protected liberty interest); Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir.
1975) (dismissal from school on claim of lack of "intellectual ability" infringes on protected liberty
interest).
14. Thus, the Supreme Court has mandated procedures for probation, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973), and parole revocation, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972),
and for the transfer of a prison inmate to a mental institution, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494
(1980). The right to pursue a chosen profession is also considered fundamental and will invoke due
process entitlements to virtually all forms of professional licensing. See Willner v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (due process protects application for bar membership);
Fleming v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 713 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1983) (treating revocation of horse
training license as intrusion on "right to practice a chosen profession"). This right may even com-
mand a fair admission procedure to a graduate school if that school plays a crucial role in entry into
the chosen profession. See Grove v. Ohio State Univ., College of Veterinary Medicine, 424 F. Supp.
377, 382-83 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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But the Supreme Court invokes these exceptions infrequently, 5 and lower
courts have begun to apply the entitlement analysis with rigor.16
The entitlement approach leads to ironic results. If parole boards, busi-
ness licensing commissions, or social security officials exercise standardless
discretion, unencumbered by procedures, and without obligations to ex-
plain their decisions, they have no constitutional obligation to follow care-
ful procedures. But if they already implement specific statutory, regula-
tory or internal standards and procedures, they must also follow the extra
requirements of due process.1 ' In Hewitt v. Helms,' Justice Rehnquist
noted the paradox of inferring due process rights from procedural rules:
The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the decisionmaking
of prison officials is, in the view of many experts in the field, a salu-
tary development. It would be ironic to hold that when a State em-
barks on such desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to
scrutiny by the federal courts, while States that choose not to adopt
15. In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 & n.11 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that a horse trainer had a right to due process before suspension of his racing license only after
examining the statute that granted him the license. The Court did not assume either that the suspen-
sion called for due process because it deprived the trainer of his fundamental right to practice his
chosen profession or that the license necessarily became a property interest once the trainer had re-
ceived it. In Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1979) (per curiam), the Court held that out-of-state
lawyers had no entitlement under Ohio law to appear in Ohio courts pro hac vice. The dissenters
argued that the attorneys' interest in discharging their professional responsibility "for the fair admin-
istration of justice" was automatically worthy of due process protection. Id. at 452-53 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
16. Zoning cases provide one example of the new rigor. Traditionally, the courts have assumed
that due process protects all applications for zoning variances without examining state law. See, e.g.,
Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 718-19 (D.N.J. 1976) (assuming
property right mandating due process in denial of zoning variance without any discussion of state
law); Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705, 709 & n.4 (D. Neb. 1976) (recognizing property right
requiring procedural due process in consideration of zoning variance application despite permissive
statutory language). In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), the Supreme
Court itself failed to apply the entitlement analysis to a zoning case. See id. at 680-82 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing majority's omission). Many recent cases, however, have applied the entitlement
analysis to applications for zoning variances and building permits. See, e.g., Littlefield v. City of
Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding property right to building permit under Minne-
sota law); Marino v. McDonald, 611 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (no property right to special
land use permit under Michigan law).
17. Compare Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980) (no entitlement to gaming
license under Nevada law) and Soderback v. Siler, 610 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 1979) (no entitlement
to merchant marine officer license) and Medina v. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244, 250-51 (1st Cir. 1976)
(no entitlement to racing license under New Hampshire law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977) with
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 & n.11 (1979) (New York law creates due process entitlement to
maintenance of racing license). Compare Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976) (no due
process rights before imposition of prison segregation) with Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287,
1291-94 (6th Cir. 1980) (regulations create due process entitlement before transfer to segregation).
For a comparison of different parole cases, see N. COHEN & J. GOBRT, THE LAW OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE § 3.13 (1983 & Supp. 1984) (majority of parole statutes held too discretionary to create
entitlement).
18. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
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such procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due
Process Clause."9
More generally, the same paradox occurs if courts infer due process rights
from the existence of state substantive guidelines; they also channel ad-
ministrative discretion, and they also are "a salutary development."
A second result of the entitlement analysis is that it enables the political
apparatus to deny procedural due process protection to virtually any inter-
est not protected by another constitutional right. The government may
leave people an unfettered right to build a house. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment may pass strict zoning laws that make building a "benefit" de-
pendent on the receipt of a license or variance.2 Government may grant
authority over actual prison sentences to a judge, whose decisions to incar-
cerate "deprive" liberty as a "right." Alternatively, government may cre-
ate a system in which judges sentence wrongdoers to unrealistically long
prison terms so that actual lengths of incarceration are determined by a
parole board. These decisions then "grant" liberty as a "benefit." By
shifting a liberty or property interest from a right to a benefit, the politi-
cal branches may deprive individuals of that interest without following
due process merely by granting administrators broad discretion.
Finally, a third result of the entitlement analysis, as Justice Rehnquist
implied, is that it discourages administrative agencies and even legislatures
from establishing rules that control adjudicative discretion. By establishing
rules that limit discretion, an agency or legislature may bring upon itself
unwanted burdens including: constitutionally required procedures more
extensive than those they wish to provide;22 a federal cause of action any
time those procedures are not followed; potential court challenges to the
19. Id. at 471.
20. For a discussion of the courts' general, but disappearing, reluctance to apply the entitlement
analysis to zoning cases, see supra note 16.
21. The federal parole system, for example, uses parole not to reward prisoners for rehabilitation
but principally to check sentencing disparity. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89
(1979). The main criteria involved in the parole decision, the severity of the offense and characteristics
of the prisoner's background, see 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1982), are the same factors entering most
judges' sentencing decisions. Even the principal source of the United States Parole Commission's in-
formation, the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, is the same source relied on by the sentencing judge.
See Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984). The recent decision by Congress to
abolish parole, which it viewed as part of the sentencing process, by replacing it with a system of
sentencing guidelines, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)-in part because of concerns over sentencing dispar-
ity notwithstanding parole, see S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 38, 46, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3182, 3221, 3229-demonstrates the interchangeability of parole and
direct sentencing.
22. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493-95 (1985), for example, a
civil service statute provided that an employee could be dismissed only for cause but provided no form
of hearing before termination. The Supreme Court held that due process mandated a pretermination
hearing.
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substance of a decision on the grounds that no evidence supported it;23
and, perhaps most distasteful from the perspective of government officials,
the possibility of personal liability for government officials any time they
fail to follow constitutionally mandated procedures.2 ' In a pointed exam-
ple of the way the rule distorts incentives, the Association of State Attor-
neys General has encouraged state prison agencies not to establish rules
and standards as a way of avoiding due process review.25
II. THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ON THE
DETERMINATION OF WHAT PROCESS IS DUE
Once a claimant establishes a right protected by due process, a court
must decide what process is "due." The existence of mandatory proce-
dures may help establish a due process entitlement,"8 but the Constitution
neither gives an individual the right to have those procedures followed nor
does it restrict an individual's rights only to those procedures. The consti-
tutional requirements of due process are independent.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the "fundamental require-
ment of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner,"' 27 but the kind of notice and the form of
the hearing required are flexible."' The requirements usually depend on
23. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2773-75 (1985) (due process
commands substantive judicial review to determine if "some evidence" supported decision to revoke
prison good time credits) (citing cases).
24. Section 1983, of Title 42 U.S.C. (1982), makes a state official acting under color of state law
liable for violating any constitutional right. Accordingly, an administrator may be liable for failing to
afford a claimant full due process rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (school officials
liable for violations of procedural due process but only for nominal damages in absence of proof of
actual injury); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1355-58 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (affirming
damage recovery under § 1983 in part because failure to afford prisoner meaningful hearing about
disputed time of release led to overcalculation of prison term).
Ira Kirschbaum, longtime Deputy General Counsel to the United States Bureau of Prisons, reports
that his office is concerned about creating due process entitlements through prison disciplinary rules
primarily because of the possibility of damage suits. He does not believe that this burden has dis-
suaded the Bureau from developing more detailed rules, however, and points to the increasing com-
plexity of federal prison policy statements. Telephone Interview with Ira Kirschbaum, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (June 7, 1985).
25. COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ArroR-
NEYS GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS: DUE PROCESS ISSUES 38 (1979).
This pamphlet also argues that administrative segregation is generally inappropriate for due process
restrictions.
26. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (mandatory procedures combined with "sub-
stantive predicates" create due process entitlement).
27. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
28. For this proposition, courts often cite Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
Notwithstanding the "flexibility" of due process, courts invariably require that the administrative
process adopt some of the elements of the traditional judicial hearing. In a famous article, the late
Judge Henry Friendly listed eleven possible elements to a hearing: (1) an unbiased tribunal, (2)
notice of the proposed action and grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity to present arguments why
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the courts' evaluation of three factors: the individual's interest at stake, the
government's interest in avoiding the encumbrance of additional process,
and the potential contribution of that process to the prevention of errone-
ous decisions."
Lower courts rarely balance these three factors on their own but instead
analogize their cases to the facts of earlier Supreme Court decisions.
These decisions have not treated administrative discretion with complete
consistency. In some "benefits" cases, the Supreme Court has suggested
that a decisionmaker's broad discretion reduces the need for procedural
protections. Thus, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex,30 the Supreme Court relied heavily on the "subjec-
tive" and "predictive" nature of the parole release decision to explain why
the Constitution requires only limited procedures and, in particular, why
the Constitution does not require a parole board to furnish an inmate
with a summary of the information it relied on in denying parole."1 Simi-
larly, in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,32
the Supreme Court refused to require even "an informal give and take"
before school officials dismiss a student for poor academic performance.
"Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the
typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision."133
In other benefits cases, including several decided in the 1984 term, the
Court has recognized that due process protections are necessary to ensure
the informed exercise of discretion. Thus, regardless of a judge or parole
board's discretion, a "parolee or probationer is entitled to an opportunity
to show not only that he did not violate [parole] conditions, but also that
there was a justifiable excuse for any violation or that revocation is not the
appropriate disposition.134 In Dixon v. Love,3 5 the Court went so far as to
point out that broad, case-by-case discretion over the suspension of
the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the right to call witnesses, (5) knowledge of the evidence
against one, (6) decisions based only on evidence presented, (7) the right to counsel, (8) the making of
a record, (9) a statement of reasons for the government's position, (10) public attendance, (11) judicial
review. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1267, 1279-95 (1975).
29. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
30. 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
31. Id. at 13-16; see also Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464 (decision to commute sentence not appropri-
ate for due process requirements because it "generally depends not simply on objective factfinding, but
also on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior").
32. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
33. Id. at 90.
34. Black v. Romano, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2258 (1985); see Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1494 ("Even
where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be . . .;" due
process requires "meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker."); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (hearing necessary before suspension even if basic facts are clear, to
permit student "to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context"); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973) (indicating due process concern for "informed use of
discretion").
35. 431 U.S. 105 (1977)
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driver's licenses would reduce fairness and promote unequal treatment; 36
accordingly, the lack of discretion under Illinois law made a pre-
termination hearing unnecessary.37 In no cases involving only the loss or
gain of a benefit, however, has the Supreme Court mandated procedures
to compensate for the dangers of discretion. 8
In contrast to the Supreme Court, a few lower courts have held that a
complete lack of agency standards violates due process and have ordered
the promulgation of meaningful standards. But these rulings make up no
regular part of the judicial arsenal; they come only in clumps limited to
similar fact patterns.3 9 More significantly, the entitlement analysis largely
forecloses this approach by depriving courts of the power to order stan-
dards in the specific situations most requiring them. The Supreme Court
has reversed a lower court decision ordering a promulgation of standards
exactly because the need for standards indicated the lack of entitlement.40
Though the most recent Supreme Court cases recognize the importance
of the informed exercise of discretion,'4 1 virtually no "benefits" cases dis-
cuss the dangers posed by broad adjudicative discretion. This failure is
puzzling because the Court has recognized these dangers so clearly in the
context of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
36. Id. at 115.
37. Id. at 113-14.
38. Of course, if the lack of standards creates a substantial possibility that benefits will be revoked
for constitutionally impermissible reasons, the Supreme Court will scrutinize for vagueness. See, e.g.,
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 158-63 (1974) (portion of opinion joined by all justices) (examining
claimed impingement on free speech). See generally infra note 55 (discussing courts' lesser tolerance
for vagueness if it threatens constitutionally protected conduct).
39. A leading case cited in many administrative law treatises is Holmes v. New York Hous.
Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). The court there held a public housing agency in violation of due
process for failing to establish any standard, even a lottery standard, for processing applications for
public housing. Id. at 265. Only a small number of cases have cited and followed Holmes, however,
and those have almost invariably dealt with other forms of government welfare benefits. See Carey v.Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978) (clothing allowance); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750,
753 (7th Cir. 1976) (general welfare assistance).
A second case cited in many law treatises is Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). It
ordered a local liquor commission to grant all applications for liquor licenses until it established
standards on which to base denials. Apart from Holmes, the only cases citing and following Hornsby,
have been liquor licensing decisions within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bloch v. Thomp-
son, 472 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Brown, 584 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Ga. 1984).
In addition, a line of cases has applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine to the revocation of govern-
ment benefits, principally business and professional licenses. See infra note 60.
40. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 441-43. Accordingly, the Second Circuit has repudiated its prior
reasoning in Holmes, see Phelps v. Housing Auth. of Woodruff, 742 F.2d 816, 822-23 & n.11 (1984),
and the Seventh Circuit has overruled its decision in Roughton, Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
640 F.2d 30, 39-40 (7th Cir. 1980). But cf Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1139
(D.N.H. 1976) (finding entitlement to welfare benefits but contradictorily ordering standards to con-
trol defendants' "unfettered and unguided discretion").
41. See supra note 34.
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III. THE DANGERS OF DISCRETION-THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE
The legendary case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins42 found two faults with San
Francisco's administrative system for licensing city laundries. The city
Board of Supervisors' discriminatory refusal to license Chinese-Americans
provided one constitutional violation for which the decision is well
remembered. But the Court wrote at greater length and with greater pas-
sion on another problem. Because no statutory standards guided the
Board's authority, the Board's discretion was "a naked and arbitrary
power to give or withold consent ' 43 which directly conflicted with "the
nature and theory of our institutions of government."'44 The threat of deci-
sions arising from "enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity,
from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of con-
cealment" made the law unconstitutional.4 5 That the ensuing decisions did
arise from prejudice provided only an additional basis of
unconstitutionality.
The portion of Yick Wo focusing on the dangers of unfettered discretion
has evolved into the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Arising out of the due
process clauses,46 this doctrine prohibits criminal and civil penalties for
violations of laws-statutory or regulatory-that leave the standards for
proscribed conduct exceptionally broad or unclear.47 Although courts ap-
ply void-for-vagueness chiefly to criminal and quasi-criminal laws, its ra-
tionales apply also to the adjudication of government benefits.
In part, void-for-vagueness assures fair warning before government
punishment. Fair warning maximizes liberty of action and assures funda-
mental fairness by assuring people that they will not be punished for be-
havior the government has not explicitly condemned.4 Although the de-
nial of a benefit may not be punishment in a criminal sense, the loss of a
42. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
43. Id. at 366.
44. Id. at 369.
45. Id. at 370.
46. In Yick Wo, the Court held that the lack of standards violated the Fourteenth Amendment in
general and did not specify any particular clause. The void-for-vagueness cases leave no doubt that the
constitutional restriction emanates from the due process clause.
47. In general, courts have tried to avoid invalidating vague statutes, developing a number of
theories to save them. Courts grant statutes a strong presumption of validity and will not invalidate
them because of difficulty in determining whether marginal offenses fall within their language. See
United States v. National Dairy Products, Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963). Economic regulations re-
ceive special deference because businesses "can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance
of action," as do laws punishable only by civil penalties because the consequences of imprecision are
"qualitatively less severe." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498-99 (1982) (citations omitted). And in a facial challenge to a vague law, courts will uphold a
law if it is valid in any of its applications unless it reaches "constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at
494-95.
48. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n.3 (1972) (citing cases).
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benefit can be substantial. Thus, even in the context of benefits, a lack of
standards threatens that people will be disadvantaged for conduct the gov-
ernment has not condemned or suggested is inappropriate for the recipient
of a particular benefit.49
The second and primary5" rationale for void-for-vagueness expresses
the same general judgment about the dangers of unguided discretion ar-
ticulated so eloquently in Yick Wo. As the Supreme Court wrote in
Grayned v. City of Rockford: "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discrimi-
natory application."51 This danger of unequal distribution of advantages
and disadvantages applies equally to the distribution of benefits.
Although present in all methods of policy-making, the risk of arbitrari-
ness and discrimination is highest in adjudication. Legislation, and to
some extent administrative rulemaking, operate openly and prospectively
through rules of general scope, thereby diminishing the possibility that
government will single out an individual for vindictive or unfair treat-
ment. Those affected have political strength in numbers to protect their
interests and to keep rule-makers accountable. 52 Policy-making in an ad-
judicative setting, however, occurs retrospectively, with the interests of
known individuals at stake, and therefore with the increased danger that
the policy developed in separate cases will be vindictive and unequal. Be-
cause it may operate differently on different individuals, it may fracture
group cohesion and leave the isolated individual with little political power
to protect her interests. Because policy decisions may go unspoken, they
may be highly antithetical to social-even constitutional-values. Thus, as
an influential commentary has summarized, a lack of standards makes
decisions "responsive to whim or discrimination unrelated to any specific
determination of need by the responsible policy-making organs of soci-
49. The doctrine that prohibits denial of a benefit for constitutionally impermissible reasons rec-
ognizes that the loss of a benefit can be a major disadvantage. See Van Alsyne, Right-Privilege Dis-
tinction, supra note 6. Furthermore, although vague laws threaten grievous loss for conduct the gov-
ernment has not explicitly condemned, the laws that do not create entitlements have no standards at
all and so threaten grievous loss for conduct the government has not condemned even remotely. As the
Supreme Court has explained in a slightly different context, "To punish a person because lie has done
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort." Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). For further discussion of the relevance of fair warning to govern-
ment benefits, see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
50. The Supreme Court has held that the "more important" purpose of void-for-vagueness doc-
trine is "the requirement that a legislature establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement,"
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983), thereby preventing "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement," id. at 357.
51. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (citing cases).
52. Equal protection and substantive due process can protect insular minorities from victimiza-
tion. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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ety. ' 55 A lack of standards undermines the due process command that
procedures assure "a certain overall probability of regularity.""
Courts have demonstrated special concern for vagueness when govern-
ment action threatens specific constitutional rights55 or life itself.56 These
cases represent a heightened scrutiny for vagueness to protect vital per-
sonal interests." But even using the weakest test courts have established
for unconstitutional vagueness-the test which provides that laws are un-
constitutional only if "no standard of conduct is specified at all" 5 -- the
typical grant of authority evading due process review fails. An individual
lacks an entitlement exactly when he can meet no set of criteria entitling
him to the desired government benefit because an administrator can deny
the benefit for any reason or "for no reason at all."'59 The authority now
exempt from due process scrutiny is the same kind of unconstrained
power to distribute government benefits condemned by the Court in Yick
Wo.
Ironically, however, the existence of unfettered discretion in the grant-
ing of government "benefits" does not technically violate the void-for-
53. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 90
(1960) (written by now-Professor Anthony Amsterdam). As of the end of the 1984 term, nineteen
Supreme Court opinions by a variety of justices have cited this Note.
54. Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
55. Courts invoke the "overbreadth" doctrine frequently to strike down vague statutes that poten-
tially infringe on freedom of speech or association. See generally Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 856-58 (1970) (placing First Amendment vagueness cases
in context of general overbreadth concern of "chilling effect" on protected speech). A number of cases,
many constitutional tort suits, have also focused on the elimination of vagueness in rules necessary to
protect Fourth Amendment rights or due process rights to criminal discovery. See Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 & n.20 (1978) (OSHA entitled to search warrant without probable
cause only if "pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria"); United States
v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (ordering investigative agencies to establish rules
ensuring preservation of all discoverable evidence).
56. Concerned with arbitrariness, the Supreme Court has held that governments can only impose
the death penalty if they provide clear standards for jury and judge. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (opinions of Douglas, Stewart, White, JJ.); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.) ("[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body
on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricous action."); id. at 220-30 (White, J., concurring). More recent Supreme Court cases may
indicate, however, that the Court pays only lip service to this demand for limits on discretion. See The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REv. 71, 118-27 (1983).
57. See generally United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(arguing that standard for indefiniteness should be stricter for statutes infringing on constitutionally
protected liberty).
58. See Smith v. Gogruen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974) (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 614 (1971)).
59. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) ("If the decisionmaker. .. 'can deny the
requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all,' the State has not
created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.") (citing Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976) (no liberty infringement in prison transfer
"so long as prison officials have discretion to transfer . . . for whatever reason or for no reason at
all").
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vagueness doctrine. Because void-for-vagueness is a doctrine of due pro-
cess, it comes into play only if an individual can demonstrate a property
or liberty entitlement. But, under the present Supreme Court approach,
an entitlement exists only if standards confine administrative discretion.
Thus, unless standards control the administration of a government pro-
gram, an individual has no constitutional right to have the program ad-
ministered with standards. 60
Even though the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is technically consistent
with the entitlement analysis, the policies of the two directly conflict. If
the former is correct that unfettered discretion undermines the due process
demand for a "probability of regularity" 1 in decisions affecting important
individual interests,62 the present analysis of procedural due process is
deeply flawed.
IV. DEFENSES OF THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF DISCRETION
The failure of procedural due process to deal with the dangers of broad
administrative discretion would not condemn the courts' analysis if other
justifications outweighed it. This Section will examine and reject various
justifications offered to support the entitlement analysis and the concom-
mittant hands-off approach to discretionary agency decisions.
60. A few lower courts have applied void-for-vagueness to benefits with more or less attention to
the existence of a property or liberty entitlement, citing both fair warning and rational enforcement
concerns. Most of these cases concern the revocation of business or professional licenses. E.g., Hous-
worth v. Glisson, 485 F. Supp. 29, 38 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ordinance permitting revocation of business
license held unconstitutionally vague without discussion of property or liberty interest); Tuma v.
Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 593 P.2d 711 (1979) (statute held void-for-vagueness as applied to
revocation of nurse's license thereby infringing on right to practice chosen profession). Some cases,
although not focusing on the existence of any protected right, might be justified as infringements on
first amendment rights like freedom of association. E.g. Alladin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 434
F. Supp. 473, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (finding ordinance denying amusement park license to those
with "connection with criminal elements" void-for-vagueness without discussion of due process
entitlement).
61. See Note, supra note 53, at 89 (emphasis omitted).
62. A defender of the courts might argue that the entitlement analysis, applicable only to benefits,
does not affect interests approaching the importance of the liberties at stake in most void-for-vagueness
cases and that, accordingly, the two doctrines are reconcilable. But the entitlement analysis focuses
only on the form of the personal interest, not on its importance. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) ("[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.") (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, the entitlement analysis permits elective governments to change important rights into
benefits. Finally, even if courts should require clear standards only to protect the most important
liberty interests, the courts' recognition that vagueness undermines values protected by procedural due
process suggests courts should, at a minimum, consider a lack of standards a danger sign requiring
compensating procedural checks.
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A. Reasons for Deference to the Political Branches
Several defenses of the entitlement analysis focus on the merit of having
the political branches of government determine whether due process shall
attach to a particular interest. One defense states simply that due process
protects only life, liberty and property "rights"63 and that rights are the
creation not of judicial divination 6 but of elective government acting
through positive law.65 A more limited version of this defense suggests
that at least to the extent government creates interests, it should have the
right to decide if they merit constitutional protection. 6 A slightly different
argument that still focuses on the role of the political branches defends the
entitlement analysis as a means of limiting due process to interests of true
importance to individuals. By protecting only the interests that elective
government has defined as rights, the courts will identify important inter-
ests yet avoid imposing due process burdens where they do more harm
then good.
67
1. The Theoretical and Practical Inability to Preserve Due Process
as a Constitutional Right
The first flaw with these "political deference" defenses of the entitle-
ment analysis, as critics across the political spectrum have already ar-
gued, 8 is their theoretical inconsistency. If elective governments create
63. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-52 (1983) (due process protects only "sub-
stantive rights").
64. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 463 (indicating reluctance to spell out "judicially divined
'entitlement"').
65. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 & n.5 (1976) (interests are "within the meaning of
either liberty or property . . . by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and pro-
tected by state law" or the Bill of Rights); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 ("Property interests, of course, are
not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . ").
66. This argument is suggested by the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply the entitlement analy-
sis to traditional, common law forms of property. See generally Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of
Property, 93 YALE L. J. 541 (1984) (discussing the Court's inconsistent approach to property rights).
The problem with this approach, however, is that no consistent principle, other than age of legal
status, distinguishes traditional from "new" property. A merit of the entitlement analysis is its ac-
knowledgment of the impossibility and inadequacy of defining property for constitutional purposes by
the traditional, common law.
67. Although he rejects the entitlement analysis, Justice Stevens has suggested this reasoning. See
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[B]y limiting the substantive reasons for
a transfer to administrative segregation and by establishing procedural protections, these regulations
indicate that the state recognizes the substantiality of the deprivation."); see also Easterbrook, Sub-
stance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. Rxv. 85, 113 ("Procedural rules usually are just a measure
of how much the substantive entitlements are worth. . . ."). Whatever the merits of this argument,
the Supreme Court's focus on the "nature" not the "weight" of an interest appears to reject it. Roth,
408 U.S. at 570-71.
68. See Easterbrook, supra note 67; Laycock, Due Process and the Separation of Powers: The
Effort to Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEx. L. REv. 875, 879-82 (1982);
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885
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"life, liberty and property" rights, why should those rights include more
than the limited procedural protection the governments provide? If courts
permit governments to "define" or "create" interests with no protections
against arbitrariness, why do they stop governments from "defining" or
"creating" interests with only limited protections against arbitrariness?69
Using entitlements as crude measures of importance does not escape
this inconsistency. The determination of what process is due depends on a
weighing of the relative importance of individual and government interests
and on the probability that a requested procedure will reduce the risk of
decisional error. 0 By inferring the importance of the individual interest
from the judgments of the political process, the courts express their un-
willingness to second-guess that judgment. But the courts have even less
justification for second-guessing the importance of the government interest
and the error-reducing value of a requested procedure, for these are mat-
ters far more within the government's expertise. 1 If courts must accept
the political judgments of an interest's importance to the individual, they
have no legitimate basis for insisting that due process demands procedural
protection the government does not already provide. 2
(1981) (labelling this problem the "positivist trap"); Redish & Marshall, Adjudicative Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 466-68 (1986); Tribe, Structural Due
Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 277-80 (1975); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Prop-
erty," supra note 6, at 464-65; Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Bene-
fits, 12 J. LEGAL STuD. 3, 6 (1983).
69. Justice Rehnquist, joined at times by three other justices, would solve this inconsistency by
holding that claimants to government "benefits" "must take the bitter with the sweet" and be satisfied
with the procedures granted them. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (opinion of
Rehnquist, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). The essence
of Justice Rehnquist's argument is that because liberty and property rights are defined in part by the
procedures provided for their protection, due process rights should be coextensive with rights provided
by statutes and regulations. But this argument would essentially constitutionalize all statutory and
regulatory procedural rules, a development with few advantages and enormous burdens. Every mem-
ber of the Supreme Court except Justice Rehnquist has now repudiated this idea. See Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) (blending substantive and procedural rights
reduces due process guarantee to "mere tautology"). For a more general discussion of "bitter with the
sweet," compare Redish & Marshall, supra note 68, at 457-68 (objecting to analysis) with Easter-
brook, supra note 67 (supporting analysis).
70. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
71. Any idea that courts' traditional expertise over judicial procedures qualifies them to substitute
their judgments about the error-reducing value of particular procedures over those of administrators
has been refuted by scholarship pointing out the extreme difficulty of the courts' job. See Mashaw,
Administrative Due Process As Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HorsntR L. REv. 1423 (1981). The Su-
preme Court has itself noted that "the judicial mode of an evidentiary hearing [the courts' subject of
expertise] is neither a required nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circum-
stances." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
72. This argument does not mean that political judgments can provide no guidance for the courts
seeking to determine the importance of individual interests. Whether most state governments do or do
not provide substantial procedural protection for an interest certainly provides evidence of its impor-
tance. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The entitlement analysis is flawed because
it obligates courts to accept the political judgment within any given locality of an interest's importance
without any inquiry into the possibility of political failure.
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2. The Conflict With Substantive Due Process
A more important failing of the "deference" justifications for the enti-
tlement analysis becomes especially evident in a comparison of procedural
with substantive due process. In contrast to their procedural due process
approach, courts applying a substantive due process analysis to strike
down arbitrary or invidious, legislative classifications"3 have not demanded
that these classifications deprive individuals of pre-existing entitlements.
Instead, in many cases, the Supreme Court has found classifications inva-
lid exactly because they impermissibly failed to provide an entitlement."
How can these cases be squared with the demand for politically recog-
nized entitlements?7
5
One argument might be that substantive due process protects only
against discrimination, and that a fundamental liberty right to be free
from discrimination emanates from the due process clauses or from other
constitutional guarantees.76 But the term "discrimination" has little inher-
ent meaning. The right to be free from discrimination is only the right not
to be disadvantaged for invidious or arbitrary reasons.7 7 In Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,78 for example, the Supreme Court applied the due
process clause to strike down a law governing the distribution of welfare
benefits solely because it distinguished between potential recipients "with-
73. The Court initiated this use of due process in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954),
essentially by incorporating equal protection theory into the Fifth Amendment on the grounds that
"discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
74. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating Social Security Act scheme of
survivor's benefits that provided less protection to female than male employees); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating system of air force employment benefits that deprived ser-
vicewomen of allowance automatically granted to servicemen).
75. A few opinions have suggested that substantive and procedural due process should have differ-
ent threshold tests, but none has suggested a reason. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
120 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (although alien might have substantive liberty interest "which
may not be arbitrarily denied by legislative enactment," he had no "general 'liberty' interest" pro-
tected by procedural due process in acquiring or retaining federal employment); see also Block v.
Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding "liberty interest flowing directly from due
process clause in not being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible reasons");
Schuemann v. Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172, 173, 174 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980)
(although Colorado parole statute was permissive, court held parole board decision subject to federal
judicial review to determine if decision was "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion").
76. See supra note 73.
77. The word "discrimination" in and of itself is meaningless, for all statutes that disadvantage
people on the basis of defined classifications "discriminate." In applying equal protection or substan-
tive due process, courts must differentiate between permissible and impermissible classifications. Only
classifications that invidiously disadvantage suspect or quasi-suspect groups, impinge on fundamental
rights, or disadvantage without a rational basis violate equal protection.
78. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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out any rational basis."79 The only liberty right at stake was the right not
to be disadvantaged arbitrarily."0
On a technical level, substantive due process cases suggest a fundamen-
tal liberty right emanating directly from the due process clauses to the
equal receipt of governmentally distributed benefits, a right that prohibits
distinctions among recipients unless those distinctions rationally further a
legitimate government policy. Yet if that right is fundamental, invoking
substantive due process scrutiny even without a positive law entitlement, it
should also invoke the scrutiny of procedural due process. Just as "arbi-
trary" or vindictive standards for distributing a benefit violate substantive
due process, so should procedures that invite adjudicators to be arbitrary
and vindictive. The right not to be disadvantaged arbitrarily is threatened
not only by improper legislative classifications but by biased, careless or
unstructured adjudcation as well.
On a deeper level, these substantive due process cases point out the
proper judicial function in due process cases. At least one motivation for
judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications is the potential lack of legisla-
tive concern for politically powerless individuals and groups; that potential
lack of concern also necessitates scrutiny of adjudicatory procedures. Just
as the government may enact classifications that victimize the politically
powerless, so may government fail to provide adequate procedures if the
interest protected has primary value to the powerless or if those powerless
have special needs for procedural protection."1
79. Id. at 538. Some evidence suggested that the illegal provision denying food stamps to house-
holds of unrelated inhabitants reflected congressional hostility to "hippie communes." Id. at 534. But
the Court was clearly concerned less with protecting hippies as a suspect class than with the arbitrary
impact of this provision on poor people living together to share costs who would otherwise be eligible
for assistance. See id. at 538.
80. In most of the due process/equal protection cases, as in most equal protection cases generally,
the courts have struck down race- or sex-based classifications through heightened scrutiny of a suspect
category. Some commentators have therefore argued that courts should conceptualize the equal protec-
tion right as a right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of defined characteristics, like race or sex. See
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). But the Supreme Court has
reiterated in recent cases that the equal protection right includes not just a right against invidious
classifications but also a right against arbitrary classifications. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (opinions
of Blackmun, J. & Powell, J.). As incorporated by the due process clause, the liberty right of equal
protection includes the right not to be disadvantaged by the arbitrary denial of a benefit.
81. In criminal adjudications, the political system may provide insufficient procedures because
careless procedures and police, prosecutor and jury discretion threaten ethnic minorities or the poor
far more than they threaten well-off whites. That prisoners are disproportionately poor and of minor-
ity races may then explain why arbitrary parole procedures are politically tolerable. Compare Easter-
brook, supra note 67, at 112 (arguing that government will provide optimal level of procedural pro-
tection for parole because "even the president of a large corporation . . . is a potential prisoner").
Insufficient procedures in the provision of business or professional licenses may result from undue
influence by those who benefit from sloppy procedures. Sloppy procedures may make decisions sus-
ceptible to political influence. Alternatively, insufficient procedures may simply reflect an ends-
oriented approach of a political majority anxious to save resources. So long as enough fishing licenses
issue to satisfy public demand for fish, for example, the public might not care how many individual
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This understanding of the courts' role shows the true nature of the enti-
tlement paradox: Although the political process will ensure that interests
* important to the majority are defined as entitlements, the political process
is likely to protect these interests with adequate procedures. The interests
not adequately protected are often likely to be those not defined as entitle-
ments. The entitlement analysis does not just present a logical paradox
but it substantively restricts constitutional due process protection exactly
to where it is not needed."2
B. The Entitlement Analysis as a Protection of Reliance
Another defense of the entitlement analysis suggested by the Supreme
Court argues that due process protects only those interests on which gov-
ernment has induced people to rely.83 The entitlement analysis provides
the proper test, according to this thinking, because government induces a
"legitimate" or "justifiable" expectation only if it explicitly promises to
provide a benefit (and not to revoke a benefit) upon the satisfaction of
specific criteria.
8 4
The reliance theory suggests an analogy to a private donor. Like the
private donor, the argument suggests, government faces no restrictions in
the way it distributes its gifts unless it estops itself. But, as already shown,
the entitlement analysis does not just determine how due process applies
to the distribution of benefits, it also determines whether an interest is a
fishermen are crushed by capricious decisionmaking. This same political failure can exist even in the
distribution of benefits, like public housing, that the government provides largely to aid the recipients.
The political majority may care more about raising slums than about assuring that the deserving have
an equal opportunity to receive the benefit. But c.f id. at 111 (arguing that political power demon-
strated by poor people to gain welfare benefits means they have power to protect themselves
procedurally).
82. Of course, the exceptions to the entitlement analysis help ensure protection for many impor-
tant interests. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. But saving a doctrine by not applying it
does not defend the doctrine itself.
83. The Supreme Court has hinted occasionally that the entitlement analysis protects not only
induced reliance but also actual reliance. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465 (focusing on substantiality
of expectation); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (right to hearing vindicates claims "upon which people rely in
their daily lives"). The contention seems untenable, however, that people's actual reliance depends on
the substantive criteria that confine administrative discretion. See Note, Statutory Entitlement and the
Concept of Property, 86 YALEs L.J. 695, 709-14 (1977) (criticizing idea that entitlements determine
actual reliance). The Supreme Court has accordingly held that even a "reasonable expectation" of a
benefit does not trigger due process unless a government promise makes the expectation legitimate.
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 443 (reasonable expectation not enough to create entitlement without "mu-
tual understanding") (emphasis in original). See also Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (requiring "legitimate. expectation"); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243
(1976) (requiring "justifiable expectation").
84. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 238 (an inmate has no liberty right to incarceration in
particular State absent statutory entitlement because he "has no justifiable expectation that he will be
incarcerated in any particular State"); Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465 (without written promise, individ-
ual's expectation of pardon is only "a unilateral hope").
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benefit in the first place. 5 Private donors have no inherent, discretionary
authority to determine what property belongs to you and what to them,
but the entitlement analysis gives that authority to the government so long
as no government rule says it cannot. (If no rule limits governmental dis-
cretion, what you might consider your property is only a government ben-
efit.) Thus, the reliance theory must presume not only that government
has the general authority to give us things arbitrarily, but also that it has
the general authority to distribute what we will and will not have
arbitrarily.
The reliance theory suffers several fatal flaws. Even if we assume that
government can induce reliance only through rules, rules with mandatory,
substantive criteria are not the only rules that induce reliance. Govern-
ment may induce reliance through unwritten rules that express an implicit
bargain, 6 through detailed, albeit permissive guidelines,87 and through
procedural protections that indicate a commitment to rational, unbiased
decisionmaking.8 8 Yet, the courts' strict entitlement analysis has denied
claims to due process in each of these categories.
More importantly, even if government can induce reliance in a common
law contract sense only through rules, rules are only one relatively insig-
nificant way in which government may induce reliance. The very exis-
tence of a government program may encourage or even force private insti-
tutions and individuals to rely on it. A subsidized student loan program,
for example, may enable universities to provide services they otherwise
could not afford and to demand fees they otherwise could not obtain. The
program may enable more people to gain college degrees, making a degree
more necessary to compete in the workplace. Finally, even as the program
increases the cost and the need for a college degree, it may discourage
private scholarship programs.8 9 As a result, an applicant denied student
85. See supra notes 20-21.
86. For example, the government may suggest that if a prisoner behaves properly, he will be
paroled or have his sentence commuted. Cf. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("The
parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up
to the parole conditions."). But see Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (per curiam) (mutual
understanding regarding parole cannot trigger liberty interest); Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465 (rejecting
circuit court holding that high statistical probability of release suggested unspoken understanding cre-
ating liberty interest in sentence commutation).
87. Detailed, albeit permissive, parole guidelines would appear to induce more legitimate reliance
on parole than general, but mandatory criteria. But see Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 &
nn.3-4 (2d Cir. 1979) (no entitlement under New York parole law and regulations despite detailed
guidelines which establish presumptive parole date because parole statute lacks mandatory language).
88. These criteria at least suggest that certain criteria, like personal bias, will not cause the denial
or revocation of an interest. But see Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 238 (prison rules mandating different
panel to initiate and to adjudicate hearing on disciplinary transfer do not create liberty interest).
89. Professor Stephen Williams argues that due process should apply to welfare benefits because
the funds used by the government deplete the resources of private donors. Williams, supra note 68, at
36-38. Government programs also discourage private initiatives, however, simply by making private
programs on the whole less necessary. Thus, even if a government program is too small to cause a
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loans may be incapable of attaining the education or the employment posi-
tion she might have attained had no student loan program existed at all.
The creation of a loan program may force an applicant to rely on its
fairness to achieve goals she could accomplish without it.
A third flaw with the reliance theory is its limited conception of the
reliance guarantee. The reliance guarantee aims to maximize individual
freedom of action.90 Accordingly, due process should not just protect peo-
ple when government has induced them to rely, it should ensure them that
they can rely. (Similarly, laws are void-for-vagueness not because they
falsely mislead people to rely but because they do not enable people to
rely.)
Finally, as the void-for-vagueness doctrine recognizes, due process does
not just protect reliance. It also protects people against the inequalities,
the invidiousness, the corruption, and the lack of accountability that result
from placing unfettered authority in the hands of some bureaucrat.91 Em-
powering obscure government officials who are far removed from political
accountability with unfettered authority over important benefits allows
them to manipulate those who depend on their decisions according to their
whim and prejudice.
C. The Argument that Discretionary Decisions Have a Limited Empha-
sis on Factfinding
A third kind of defense of the courts' due process analysis suggests that
broad discretion itself makes decisions inappropriate for due process limi-
tations. Starting with the premise that process has value only to the extent
that it minimizes the risk of "error" in the "truthfinding process, '
2 some
cases have suggested that if decisions depend on "subjective evaluations
and on predictions of future behavior" that are not based solely on facts,
they are inappropriate for due process procedures.9 As one circuit court
has reasoned, unless an interest is conditioned on "one or more controvert-
ible facts, a hearing and notice would be pointless."
94
Even if we assume that erroneous factfinding is the sole concern of due
serious drain on private resources, it may still become a necessity to anyone active in the affected field.
90. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
91. "Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of
some ruler, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat." Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649,
1665 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
92. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14-15 & n.7 (1979) (discussing only errors of fact among
"possible risk[s] of error").
93. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
94. Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30, 41 (7th Cir. 1980).
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process,' 5 this argument is flawed, for discretionary decisions still require
facts. As Justice Powell has written about the parole release decision,
"unless the parole board makes . . . determinations in some arbitrary or
random fashion, their subjective evaluations about future success on parole
also must be based on retrospective factual findings.""8 In fact, a principal
justification for granting adjudicators broad discretion is the need to mold
policy to the facts of varying situations. As the Supreme Court has now
held, due process is necessary to assure that discretionary decisions are
based on informed factfinding and to assure individuals an opportunity to
invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker. 7
More significantly, this argument is flawed because due process protects
against sources of error that result not from factual error but merely from
abuses of discretion. (Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that factfinding
error may not be a due process concern at all if it results only from negli-
gence and so does not represent an abuse of government power. 8) Al-
though the typical due process requirements for notice and a hearing may
serve primarily to assure accurate factfinding, many traditional due pro-
cess requirements serve primarily to curb abuses of discretion, including
prophylactic rules to prevent vindictiveness and bias,"9 appellate review
for abuses of discretion, and the presence of the public at trial. Due pro-
cess protections can also go beyond the traditional focus on notice and
hearing and include management techniques' 00 or liability rules (and
should include decisionmaking standards). Thus, even where all the facts
95. A number of judicial opinions and scholarly writings have asserted that procedural due pro-
cess serves important values in addition to the prevention of any kind of error. For the views of two of
the best known advocates of "dignitary" values, see J. MASHAW, supra note 2, and Michelman,
Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 126(J. Pennock & J. Champman eds. 1977). For doubts about the extent to which these values are truly
non-instrumental and doubts about the ability of courts to incorporate them into a due process analy-
sis, see Redish & Marshall, supra note 68, 482-91; Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme
Court; A Defense of Roth and Perry, 21 Calif. L. Rev. 146, 187 (1983) (reviewing literature). For adiscussion of whether procedural due process should also be available to protect other constitutional
rights, as many have argued, see id. at 190.
96. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 20 (Powell, J., concurring).
97. See cases cited supra note 34.
98. See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668,
670 (1986).
99. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (to resentence defendant to more
severe punishment after successful appeal, judge must provide statement of reasons justifying sentence
on basis of defendant's conduct after original sentencing); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge
with pecuniary bias must recuse himself). The Supreme Court's holdings that judicial-type hearing
requirements are less necessary if government and individual interests are in harmony also reflects a
sensitivity to situations that reflect greater or lesser potential for adjudicative abuse. See Greenholtz,
442 U.S. at 13-14; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480; c.f. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (com-
munity of interest between children and parents seeking to confine them in mental institutions makes
many procedural protections unnecessary).
100. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes
on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) (arguing for use of quality control mechanisms).
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are clear and only discretionary judgments remain unsettled, many forms
of due process protection are still highly relevant.1" 1
V. INTEGRATING THE NEED FOR STANDARDS INTO PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
Although broad administrative discretion is dangerous, rigid and exces-
sive rules pose alternative dangers. Too many rules, to quote Judge
Wright, may "exchange Lewis Caroll's fantasy for Franz Kafka's
nightmare."10 2 Administrators frequently do not know enough to promul-
gate precise rules, 103 and the rules they do promulgate, if too rigid, may
produce poor results. A benefit of making policy through adjudication is
that it permits those affected to participate in forming the rules that deter-
101. Professor Peter Simon advances another reason to exempt discretionary decisions from due
process review. See Simon, supra note 95. He argues that procedural review of discretionary decisions
inevitably leads to substantive review to make the procedures meaningful. In turn, that substantive
review alters the bases of administrative decisionmaking against the legislative will-discouraging in-
tuition and entrenching the status quo-as administrators seek to make only those decisions that they
can defend in court. In contrast, argues Simon, review of non-discretionary decisions alters substan-
tive, legislative purposes much less.
The first response to this argument is that procedural protections need not lead inexorably to sub-
stantive review. The purpose of procedural protection is to institutionalize a method of decision-
making that will produce rational decisions without substantive judicial review. Courts must resist the
temptation to engage in routine, substantive review, for procedures assure only probability of regular-
ity, not regularity itself.
The second response to Simon is that intuition differs from discretion. Decisionmakers can use
intuitive factfinding regardless of whether they implement specific standards or follow careful proce-
dures. Thus, there is no particular reason to believe that legislatures grant administrators broad dis-
cretion to encourage them to use their intuition; legislatures may simply wish administrative deci-
sionmakers to develop their own standards either through rules or through adjudication. Procedural
scrutiny of discretionary decisions threatens no more of an interference with legislative will than pro-
cedural scrutiny of nondiscretionary decisions.
Professor Simon also supports the exemption for discretionary decisions on the grounds that the
traditional nonreviewability of many kinds of discretionary decisions (e.g., prosecutorial discretion,
jury findings, executive clemency) indicate that not all government decisions need be rational. Id. at
161-69, 191. But the primary justifications for these areas of nonreviewability (whether or not they
are sufficient) are the special government interests in not being encumbered by procedures, not the
satisfaction of arbitrary action. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chancy, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656 (1985) (primary
justifications for nonreviewability of enforcement decisions are special expertise over use of enforce-
ment resources, special difficulty of judicial review, and, to some extent, constitutional commitment to
executive branch). In other words, we justify nonreviewability only after applying a due process anal-
ysis, not before.
102. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Review), 81 YALE L.J. 575, 576 (1972).
103. Professor Kenneth Davis argues persuasively, however, that ignorance need not prevent
rulemaking. See DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIINARY INQUIRY 59-64 (1969). Admin-
istrators can make rules not only in the traditional form of binding statements but also in the form of
standards and criteria or even in the form of examples. In this way, administrators can set out their
basic approach to problems without having to determine in advance how they will respond to unusual
fact patterns. For a good example of this type of rulemaking, see UNrrED STATES DEPT. OF JUsTIcE,
ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977).
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mine their interests.'" Accordingly, determining the optimal precision of
administrative rules may be difficult.
Focusing on the the need for standards does not force courts fully to
confront this difficulty. Although the optimal precision of administrative
rules is hard to determine, determining the optimal mix of procedural
protections that are the focus of traditional due process scrutiny is equally
difficult." 5 Courts avoid this difficulty in part by setting only minimum
standards. 06 Agencies rarely have an excuse for promulgating no "ascer-
tainable standards. 107
A second way of dealing with the difficulties of fine-tuning is to leave
the actual mix of procedural protections to the agencies. If an agency pro-
fesses good reasons for leaving broad, even unfettered discretion in the
hands of individual adjudicators, a court does not have to judge the merits
of its assertions. Courts can respond only by insisting that the agency
compensate for the dangers of this approach with alternative proce-
dures.108 One important trade-off might involve statements of reasons: the
more general the standards adjudicators use, the greater the need for com-
prehensive explanations of their final decisions.109 Courts might also insist
104. In fact, the very use of agency rulemaking to make policy has been challenged, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, as an improper denial of a party's right to a full hearing at the time the rules are applied.
See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). For an argument that thisparticipation should be constitutionally required if important privacy rights are at stake, and an inter-pretation of the Supreme Court's short-lived irrebutable presumption cases in this light, see Tribe,
supra note 68.
105. Scholars have begun to identify the factors that determine the merits in particular cases ofhaving tight or loose rules. See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.65 (1983). Diver identifies three principal tradeoffs: transparency, the clarity of rules based on the use
of words with well-defined and universally accepted meanings; accessibility, the easy comprehension
of the rule in concrete situations by its intended audience; and congruence, the communication of a
substantive content that actually produces the correct results. Id. at 67, 71-72.
Loose rules that leave broad discretion to individual adjudicators are not the only ways of ensuring
flexibility, however. Agencies may also have tight rules that create strong presumptions, yet combine
them with a developed process for permitting exceptions. See generally Aman, Administrative Equity:An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277 (reviewing court cases and
statutes and attempting to form system of equitable rules for permitting exceptions). Under the aegis
of federal administrative law, federal courts have encouraged agencies to use an exceptions process.
See, e.g., WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (1969) (insisting on meaningful response to request
for waiver of agency rules).
106. The Fifth Circuit, for example, following its holding in Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5thCir. 1964), that a complete lack of standards for liquor licensing violated due process, proved willing
to tolerate an ordinance that lacked "much in the way of precision." Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v.
Allen, 389 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1968).
107. In Hornsby, the Fifth Circuit ordered the liquor licensing board to establish "ascertainable
standards by which an applicant can intelligentsly seek to qualify for a license." 326 F.2d at 612.108. Judge Friendly has suggested, "fi]f an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally
demanded with respect to one item [of a hearing], this may afford good reason for diminishing or even
eliminating another." Friendly, supra note 28, at 1279; accord Buss, supra note 6, at 639 (endorsing
this approach for applying due process to school setting). The Supreme Court appears to have ac-
cepted this idea. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51 (1984) (implying that one form of proceduralprotection in death penalty context-viz., proportionality review---could compensate for other checks).109. Courts have taken this approach to protect against abuses of administrative discretion in
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that agencies compensate for broad discretion with an open system of pre-
cedent that forces the development of more precise standards over time,
10
or with a system of meaningful internal administrative review with inde-
pendent adjudicators. If the justification for broad, case-by-case discretion
lies in the importance of molding policy to the particulars of individual
situations, adjudicators need the participation of those affected to under-
stand those particulars fully. 11 Finally, courts should consider manage-
ment control techniques and liability rules. These protections may dimin-
ish the potential for the abuse of government power without inflicting
unnecessary bureaucratization on administrative activity.
Eradicating the entitlement analysis does not imply rejecting the use of
some threshold test for invoking due process. The availability of due pro-
cess litigation offers those dissatisfied with government decisions the capa-
bility of applying enormous pressure on their behalf. If cases cannot be
dismissed at the pleadings stage, dissatisfied parties may unfairly harass
and inflict high legal costs on a wide range of government operations that
applying federal administrative law. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975) (agency
must "delineate and make explicit the basis upon which discretionary action is taken" and 
reason
should "cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies") (citation omitted); Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (suggesting that agency "articu-
late. . . standards and principles" to govern discretion but ordering, if agency alternatively chooses 
to
develop standards case-by-case, that it "articulate the criteria that [it] develops in making each indi-
vidual decision"). Courts have also obligated agencies to explain explicitly any departure from prior
norms. See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653 (1954) (reversing ad-
ministrative decision because "Commission has not adequately explained its departure from prior
norms"); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[Ain
agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior rules and standards
are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored."), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
110. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Supreme Court upheld the use of
adjudication to make policy because of the problems presented by agency inexperience and by the
adjudication of unforeseeable, specialized, or varying matters. These problems justified "the case-by-
case evolution of statutory standards." Id. at 203. The Court did not, however, uphold a continuous
use of ad hoc decisionmaking without any attempt to evolve standards. Unless adjudicators make some
attempt to build policy out of individual adjudications, the Chenery justification for ad hoc discretion
collapses.
111. Applying this approach to Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), suggests that the very discretionary and intuitive nature of the parole
decision should increase the obligations for other protections. Parole discretion increases the likelihood
that decisions will be unequal, that parole boards will penalize conduct that society as a whole consid-
ers acceptable and that decisions will be motivated by personal vindictiveness. Furthermore, if parole
boards are to use subtle, subjective evaluations of inmates in making decisions, they should at least
seek to give some structure to their intuitions through a statement of evidence. Indeed, a subjective
decision is all the more influenceable by erroneous hearsay, so access to a parole file would appear
essential. In contrast, a parole decision based on objective factors, like the federal parole system, see 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1984), gives a prisoner relatively easy notice of the evidence a parole board has used
and reduces the potential mischieviousness of false innuendo.
Similarly, in Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the very fact
that dismissal did not follow automatically from poor academic performance but from a discretionary
decision demonstrates the importance of some kind of "informal give and take." In contrast, a non-
discretionary rule would present little reason for any kind of hearing but only an opportunity for
challenging the factual accuracy of the academic record.
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distort their decisionmaking. Granting process rights to everyone, further-
more, may crowd out the process rights of those with most at stake.
Instead of relying on the existence of discretion, however, the availabil-
ity of due process should depend on more appropriate criteria. The courts
can accept a de minimis exemption from the requirements of due process
if the individual interest is minor,112 or a "de maximis" exception if the
government interest is overwhelming. Finally, some kind of standing re-
quirement might deny due process rights to some parties if a limitation is
necessary to protect the impact of the due process rights of those with
most at stake.11
CONCLUSION
At root, support for the entitlement analysis may rest on reluctance to
impose growing procedural burdens and continuing lawsuits on govern-
ment agencies. The value of administrative process is virtually impossible
to measure while the bureaucratization and legal expenses it forces on
government agencies are highly visible. The entitlement analysis permits
agencies to escape due process by writing their rules in particular ways.
But if agency emancipation is our aim, the entitlement analysis does not
accomplish it. Many administrators continue to prescribe mandatory stan-
dards that bring decisions under due process scrutiny despite the disincen-
tive of the entitlement analysis. Even those who are hostile to judicial de-
mands for process have no reason to burden those administrators in
particular or to encourage them to abandon their standards.
Other factors remaining equal, substantive standards reduce the threat
of government abuse. A lack of standards increases the need for other
forms of procedural protection. By exempting some decisions under sensi-
ble threshold criteria, by permitting adjudicators to choose their own mix-
ture of procedural protections, and by concentrating not only on hearing
112. The Supreme Court accepted the de minimis principle in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576(1975); see also Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Ed., 679 F.2d 279, 282 (Ist Cir. 1982) (short suspension from
school bus service is de minimis); Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 & n.12 (M.D.N.C.1979) (four months suspension from public school extra-curricular activities is de minimis).113. Thus, a potential government contractor should probably not have a due process right to afair bidding opportunity on every government contract. See Coyne-Delayny Co. v. Capital Dev. Co,616 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1980) (no general due process rights to hearing before government purchasingdecision); c. Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667, 678 (N.D. Ga.1982) (would-be lessor of aircraft facility has no due process right to competitive bidding on lease),
affld mem., 729 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1984). On the other hand, government contractors invited to bid
should probably have due process rights to a fair consideration of their bid. But see Polyvend, Inc. v.Puckonis, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 32 Ill. Dec. 872, 395 N.E.2d 1367 (1979) (denying any such rights). Con-
tractors should also have due process rights before government excludes them from all contracting. SeeArt Metal-USA, Inc. v. Solomon, 473 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1978) (before government contractor
may be blacklisted from future contracts, due process requires notice and hearing of charges against
it).
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procedures but also on management and liability protections against adju-
dicative abuse, courts can protect against the dangers of discretion without
increasing their intrusiveness into administrative management.
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